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CHAPTER 40

BUILDING A MULTILATERAL CIVILIAN SURGE

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INTRODUCTION

THE United States and NATO entered the previous decade fully prepared to win the last war, but ill-equipped for the conflicts that would soon unfold. US reconstruction and stabilization capacity was all but non-existent, having been allowed to wither in the aftermath of Vietnam. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan represent major shifts in the nature of operations for both military and civilian government agencies. It was not until the middle of the decade that the United States recognized and began to meet the challenge at hand. The US military took the first steps to change force structure and doctrine. Civilian agencies eventually followed suit but their capacity still lags far behind the military. A 'civilian surge' began in 2009 when President Barack Obama announced a policy to substantially increase the number of US civilians on the ground in Afghanistan to 'advance security, opportunity, and justice—not just in Kabul, but from the bottom up in the provinces.' The United States has taken steps to correct the imbalance between the growth of military and civilian capabilities for complex operations over the last decade.¹ NATO must also embrace this change and develop the resources required so that its military and civilian efforts have a unitary approach that begins with initial planning long before operations are undertaken.

The United States and the Alliance agree that a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution, post-conflict stabilization, and, ultimately, reconstruction is key to successful execution of complex operations. A truly comprehensive approach draws on the full array of military and civilian and national and international resources, applying them robustly across all phases of a conflict to bring the stricken populace to a state of security, basic services, and legitimate governance as rapidly as possible.² Yet the political, military,

and economic resources essential to success are rarely committed and integrated in this well-accepted and broadly prescribed approach.³ While the United States has established policies and written doctrine to address the demands of such future conflicts, it struggles to turn these decisions into actionable operational concepts and genuine capabilities. This is even truer of NATO, and the Alliance has much further to go to realize its own Comprehensive Approach initiative.⁴ Civilians must be involved in all phases of the response, beginning with pre-conflict planning, through to a desired end state with relative peace. To do so will require the development of greater civilian planning capacity and robust expeditionary civilian capabilities at national and international levels.

INTEGRATION EFFORTS IN THE UNITED STATES

At the top levels of the US government it is accepted policy that civilian agencies will play a pivotal role in future conflicts. The Department of State (DoS) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) are augmenting their abilities to assist in the development or restoration of governance. Military means are no longer sufficient for winning wars. With increasing frequency, these diplomatic and economic elements of national power are necessary for achieving the strategic objectives for which the nation went to war.

Military Efforts to Empower Civilians

The political goals of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the absence of DoS capacity at the outset of those conflicts obliged the Department of Defense (DoD), albeit reluctantly, to fill the civilian capability gap with military resources and personnel, and with private contractors. The learn-as-we-go nature of this effort generated controversy in Washington over the lack of alternative solutions. The dearth of civilian capacity for reconstruction and stabilization and the need to rapidly surge the number of civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan required the military to look to contractors as a force multiplier. The number of contractors soared, at one point even reaching a one-to-one ratio of contractors to US military personnel in Iraq.⁵ The heavy reliance on contractors also led to the loss of significant institutional knowledge and in-house expertise throughout the US government. It further raised concern of some host governments; for example, in Afghanistan, President Karzai ultimately prohibited the use of security contractors in Afghanistan. In the future, DoD and State must be able to maintain a suitable balance of in-house and outsourced expertise and a cadre of skilled contract managers, so they can exercise appropriate oversight.

Accepting the demands of its changing mission, the DoD took steps to balance its capabilities for the requirements of today's conflicts. In 2005, Department of Defense

Directive 3000.05 declared that stability operations are a core US military mission, to be accorded priority comparable to major combat operations.⁶ As a result, the US Army shifted tens of thousands of its occupational specialties. The Army also developed new joint operational concepts, and field manuals were written on stability operations, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare. FM 3-0 *Operations*, FM 3-07 *Stability Operations*, and FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* all refocus military efforts on the stability operations mission and have major implications for military force training and planning. The shifting of capabilities and strategies is not limited to the US Army. Joint Publication 3-07 *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War* and the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept are also being updated to reflect the requirements of today's conflicts. The most recent Maritime Strategy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, built on the requirements of reconstruction and stabilization missions and declares that 'preventing wars is as important as winning wars.'

In addition to official shifts in strategy, military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere have created a large cadre of officers and enlisted personnel with the skill sets required for complex operations. Today, all regional combatant commands have developed small inter-agency civilian cohorts, usually called Joint Interagency Coordination Groups, to provide inter-agency advice to their military staffs, primarily during planning. Under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the military began to encourage the development of an enhanced civilian capability. 'The civilian component of what we're doing is critical to success for our country,' Secretary Gates told US soldiers in Kirkuk, Iraq, in early December 2009, echoing his often-expressed concern that US civilian agencies do not have the resources necessary to meet their mission requirements.⁷ Acknowledging that civilian agencies are chronically underfunded for these demands, Secretary Gates transferred DoD funding for reconstruction and stabilization missions. In an effort to bring clarity to the debate over roles and mission in reconstruction and stabilization, in December 2009 Secretary Gates proposed giving the State Department shared authority for programmes that have a clear connection to security, placing traditional defence, foreign, and development policy back under the purview and authorities of their traditional agencies. This new structure would allocate up to \$2 billion in additional funding for nation-building activities, including security capacity-building, stabilization, and conflict prevention.⁸ Under this proposal, joint civil-military field teams would develop operational plans, which both the Chief of Mission and the Combatant Commander would then endorse before any action is taken. Both the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense would give final approval.

Civilian Agency Efforts

In addition to the Department of Defense, the Department of State and US Congress have begun to take steps to counterbalance what some have called the 'militarization' of foreign policy. For much of the past decade the civilian agencies lacked the capacity and resources necessary to transition societies from conflict into stability. Only recently has

this begun to improve. The first requirement was a culture change within the civilian agencies forcing 'diplomats and aid providers [to] let go of the notion that they can sit safely on the sidelines of conflict until the smoke clears.'⁹

The paucity of civilian capacity for reconstruction and stabilization, and its necessity for future US international efforts, was identified in the 1990s, when the Clinton Administration issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, 'Managing Complex Contingency Operations.' The Clinton administration intended for PDD 56 to achieve unity of effort among US Government agencies and international organizations engaged in complex contingency operations through specific management practices and planning processes. PDD 71, 'Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems in Support of Peace Operations,' conveyed a similar message, citing, in particular, the lack of civilian personnel to aid the host nation in establishing appropriate security forces and implementing political and economic programmes. However, executive branch attention to civilian capacity waned until December 2005, when National Security Presidential Directive 44 designated the State Department as the lead for reconstruction and stabilization activities involving coordination with all relevant US government departments and agencies. While State was the lead on paper, it did not have the capabilities or resources to translate policy to the operational level. Officials have only recently emphasized the need for development of capacity at the State Department. Strengthened recognition of the requirement for inter-agency collaboration in complex operations could come through Congressional authorization of the multi-agency reconstruction funding suggested by Secretary Gates in 2009. This type of effort, however, is still in a nascent phase within the Departments of Defense and State and the US Agency for International Development.

At the State Department, the introduction of the Lugar-Biden bill in 2004, leading to the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), was an important first step to organize and develop civilian capacity for complex operations. The State Department was in need of adequate planning mechanisms for reconstruction and stabilization operations, efficient inter-agency coordination structures and procedures in carrying out such tasks, and appropriate civilian personnel for many of the non-military tasks required.¹⁰ Unfortunately, this new office was 'underfunded, understaffed and unappreciated within the State Department.'¹¹ When the Lugar-Biden bill became law in 2008, it gave the State Department more resources to begin to meet the need for civilian capacity. Working with a small staff, compared to the substantial manpower of the military, 'S/CRS has taken steps to monitor and plan for potential conflicts, to develop a rapid-response crisis management "surge" capability, to improve interagency and international coordination, to develop interagency training exercises, and to help the Regional Bureaus of the State Department develop concepts and proposals for preventive action.'¹² In an effort to build operational capabilities, S/CRS created a civilian 'surge' capability for use in stabilization and reconstruction operations requiring a quick response. The Civilian Response Corps (CRC) consists of an active standing civilian capacity that is trained and rapidly deployable to austere environments (the CRC-A) and a standby corps of US government civilian agency employees who are trained and able to deploy on an as-needed basis. As of this

writing, the CRC-A has approximately 100 members and the Standby component has 810 members.¹³

Not far from Foggy Bottom, USAID—established in 1961 under the Foreign Assistance Act to lead the US development effort—is also in need of a surge in its capacity to meet the demands of complex operations. At one time, USAID possessed the institution-building skills needed in the vulnerable countries we are assisting today. However many of those skills were lost in the downsizing of the USAID Foreign Service since the 1970s, as personnel fell from about 12,000 to fewer than 2,000 today.

USAID is taking steps to regain some of its former capacity. Shortly after the establishment of S/CRS, USAID created the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) to improve its coordination with DOD in Washington and at the combatant commands. Around the same time, USAID also began to implement the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF), a standardized diagnostic tool used to gather information from local inhabitants to identify the causes of instability or conflict in a unit's area of operation.¹⁴ However, the creation of new offices and tools for conflict assessment is not sufficient. What USAID needs is greater capacity to return the agency to its former capabilities. One such vehicle is the Development Leadership Initiative, which aims to double the number of USAID Foreign Service Officers by 2012.¹⁵ This effort should continue in order to provide USAID with the capacity to support the increasing demands of stabilization and reconstruction missions. It is also crucial that these new Foreign Service Officers embrace the expeditionary and operational mindset present in the OMA or S/CRS and understand the culture and requirements of complex operations.

Stability operations publications from the National Defense University and elsewhere identify and categorize the missions and tasks involved in complex operations. This information provides policy-makers insights that enable them to determine the mix of civilian skills needed to conduct these operations in the future. Most of the sixty tasks—associated with six mission categories: restore and maintain security, promote effective governance, conduct reconstruction, sustain economic development, support reconciliation, and foster social change—would be best done by civilians, with the military in a supporting role.¹⁶ In addition to USAID, DoS, and DoD, many of the skills required for success in complex operations are found in the US domestic agencies—the departments of Justice, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Homeland Security, Transportation, Labor, Energy, Interior, Health and Human Services, and Education. These agencies do not contribute significant resources to complex operations missions, often to the detriment of those missions. This deficiency is not necessarily due to a lack of desire but because of a lack of legislative mandate, resources, and personnel. The absence of a legal basis in US Code to support complex operations overseas amounts to a formidable disincentive to participation and needs to be rectified by the Congress in order to utilize the capabilities and reachback found in the domestic agencies. A comprehensive approach must focus on capabilities and capacity, not who the civilians are or what department employs them. Agencies must be given the statutory mandate and incentives to support these missions. Within the United States, S/CRS and the CRC are making great strides in this area, but more must be done to recruit and train a cadre of complex operations professionals.

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ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES

As in the United States, NATO leadership understands that the reconstruction and stabilization missions being conducted today are the new norm and that civilian skills noted here are needed to be successful. As NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said, 'the military is necessary—but it is not sufficient'.¹⁷ The Alliance is adapting, but the changes are not easy and the process requires shifting priorities and resources, both physical and financial, and requires both time and skill to move from a design phase into a genuine operational change. NATO also recognizes that the international coordination and collaboration necessary in complex operations are often late to arrive and fall short of the necessary focus on close, constant cooperation. Instead of being driven by predetermined strategic partnerships, these efforts are typically ad hoc and piecemeal.

Current Efforts

Over the past decade, NATO has been pursuing European and transatlantic security objectives through a more integrated approach. At recent summits, including Riga in 2006, Bucharest in 2008, and Strasbourg-Kiehl in 2009, the Alliance acknowledged that Afghanistan is its greatest challenge and emphasized a necessary focus on strengthening regional partnerships with the EU and other entities to achieve security. NATO already has the greatest military capability of any multinational organization in the world. The Alliance has had a mission in Kosovo since 1999 and a mission in Afghanistan since 2004. NATO's first and only other major land force deployment, to maintain a peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, lasted from 1996 to 2005. These long-running missions underscore the critical need for greater cooperation and partnership among the agencies providing security and those trying to achieve development.¹⁸

NATO's current and future military operations would be enhanced by complementary civilian capacities that can rapidly deploy to conflict areas. To solidify cooperation and increase this capacity, NATO should endeavour to work more closely with key civilian institutions—including the European Union, United Nations, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, among others. A lesson learned from recent and current reconstruction and stabilization missions is that early mistakes are difficult to undo. However, as a multinational organization dependent on member contributions, NATO has limitations when it comes to civilian capacity. To date, any NATO civilian capabilities have focused on logistical support to military operations. NATO does not intend to develop a large civilian capacity. However, as stated by the NATO leadership, the Alliance should develop a small civilian capability that is not reliant on any other institution. A NATO component of roughly 250 member-nation civilian employees with varying areas of expertise would be able to deploy to a combat zone or austere

environment within forty-eight hours. As a military organization, NATO needs trained civilians who can enhance its ability to work with civilian partners. The NATO 2020 report calls on NATO to integrate the identification of civilian capabilities into the Defence Planning Process. The group also recommends that NATO ask its member states to identify civilian specialists who could support missions requiring rapid deployment.¹⁹ NATO is beginning to utilize the COMPASS database as a means for tracking member nations' civilian experts with the skills required for stability operations. The development of a rapidly deployable civilian capability could help to avoid mistakes and could be critical to the success of NATO missions. This requirement should be supported and resourced by all member nations.

Within its headquarters structure, options for NATO include organizing civilian resources using the model of the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee and Civil Emergency Planning Directorate to coordinate national non-military contributions.²⁰ Other experts have also recommended that NATO develop a theatre command under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to operationalize the Comprehensive Approach and ensure full civil-military integration.²¹ NATO currently facilitates the conduct of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) operations through training and exercises for interaction with civilians in a conflict environment, including local authorities and representatives of other governmental and non-governmental civilian agencies. One such vehicle, the CIMIC Center of Excellence (COE), provides training for operational teams and planners working on CIMIC-related missions and developing CIMIC doctrine.²² The CIMIC COE did not have the resources to support operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan but has been getting more attention from Allied Command Transformation (ACT). As with its military support, NATO is dependent on civilian contributions from its member nations.

NATO member states have a substantial reservoir of untapped civilian capabilities. As NATO's primary regional partner, the EU offers civilian capacity and capabilities in the areas of governance, infrastructure reconstruction, and civil-sector development, including customs and border matters, policing and judicial systems, institution and facilities development, and resourcing commercial enterprise. While these are promising for the future, the EU's current contributions are primarily in the economic and social sectors. The EU has deployed eleven civilian special representatives to specific crisis areas, such as Afghanistan, the Middle East, the African Great Lakes Region, and Kosovo, among others, to coordinate EU military, rule of law, and civilian aid programmes. The special representatives report directly to the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Council. However, the EU's competencies for civilian crisis response fill a much wider portfolio and include programmes for humanitarian aid, assistance to displaced persons, civil protection, democracy building, rule of law, human rights protection, food aid and security, reconstruction, and mine action.

Notably, Denmark has also initiated various efforts to increase civilian capacity. The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and the Defence Command Denmark have laid the groundwork for an inter-ministerial working group tasked

with the goal of developing a corps of personnel with stabilization and reconstruction expertise. The working group will make recommendations on how to strengthen civilian capacities by addressing issues of recruitment, incentive structures for civilian experts, vacancy schemes, training, and protection. The stabilization and reconstruction initiative will expand the existing International Humanitarian Service (IHS) reserve corps. Additionally, Denmark is looking to establish a lessons-learned hub, to ensure that best practices are developed and fed into the planning of future stabilization missions.²³ The UK has similarly made efforts to strengthen its stabilization and reconstruction capacities. In 2003 the government called on civil departments to contribute to military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007, a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit was instituted, similar to the US CRC, which was later replaced by the Stabilization Unit. This unit has sixty members and a standby reserve of 1,000 qualified civilians who are willing to deploy overseas, 200 of whom are current civil servants within the Ministry of Defence or Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The UK is increasing its efforts to broaden that base to other civilian departments. A unique feature of the UK is that the main funding source for reconstruction and conflict prevention operations comes from a tri-departmental funding pool. This mechanism forces greater inter-agency collaboration and prioritization. From a multilateral standpoint, both the UN and EU have undertaken efforts to develop civilian capacity for complex operations. NATO must draw upon these efforts and other member-nation resources, including those of the USA, to strengthen its own capabilities.

The Comprehensive Approach

In an effort to repair and prevent the types of disconnects evident in NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, Denmark detailed a concept called 'Concerted Planning and Action'. The Danes observed that NATO's responses in both operations had been initiated without early and effective civil-military coordination, and did not incorporate lessons learned in previous operations. The result was a waste of effort, resources, and, ultimately, lives, while organizations sorted out tasks and relationships in the midst of a crisis rather than beforehand, in the so-called zero or shaping phase of crisis response. This topic evolved into what is today the Comprehensive Approach and was added to NATO's agenda in 2006. The premise behind this approach is to apply all elements of power with sufficient resources early in a crisis (or post-conflict situation) in order to greatly reduce the social, economic, and physical damage to the society under stress, and hasten the return to peace at lower cost to all concerned—the protagonists as well as the international community.²⁴

The original aim of a comprehensive approach was not to develop new NATO capabilities, but to strengthen the capabilities in civil emergency planning that the Alliance had maintained throughout the Cold War and in the years since. The approach emphasized cooperation with other international organizations, initially at the strategic level and ultimately at the operational level.²⁵ In November 2006 at the Riga summit, NATO

endorsed the Comprehensive Approach as its concept for conflict management and response. NATO leaders directed that an Action Plan be developed for how the Alliance would incorporate the Comprehensive Approach internally and in its relations with other organizations, most notably the UN and EU. The Action Plan was endorsed in April 2008 at Bucharest. Since that time, NATO staffs have been implementing efforts to improve NATO's crisis management and relevant planning procedures, improve practical cooperation with the UN and other organizations, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local actors, and enhance NATO's military support to stabilization and reconstruction operations throughout all phases of conflicts.²⁶

The most difficult obstacle to realizing the Comprehensive Approach results from Turkey and Cyprus vetoing cooperation between the EU and NATO. In NATO, Turkey vetoes sharing information with the EU because of the membership of Cyprus. The situation is reversed in EU votes, with Cyprus vetoing collaboration with NATO because of Turkish membership. This precludes the deepening of NATO–EU relations and leads to serious operational challenges. As a first step towards a solution, both countries might agree to a moratorium on vetoes on issues related to Afghanistan to avoid limiting future actions and fully implement coordination and integrated planning. The success of the Comprehensive Approach initiative depends on NATO and EU leaders giving full support to the effort. However, the EU and NATO have yet to develop a documented process for pre-crisis planning and crisis response coordination, in spite of their well-established, side-by-side operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. The void in an agreed NATO–EU cooperation mechanism is a gaping hole in achieving strong partnerships among the major international organizations available for crisis response.

The time required to develop a true comprehensive approach should not deter the Alliance from pursuing one. The earlier the transition begins, the sooner the international community and the affected nations will benefit from a coordinated, comprehensive international approach to conflict and crisis resolution. NATO has begun working with key partners and allies, including Belgium, France, and the United States, to devise a more effective implementation plan and to frame what a NATO civilian capability will look like. This process should include conducting an extensive survey of its membership to determine what level of civilian capacity each nation is willing to provide. With participation by over ten countries, NATO's 2009 'Arcade Fusion' exercise explored how an international civilian capability can be applied to integrate both planning and operations. The exercise went beyond civil-military coordination and fostered thinking on new ways of integrated assessment, planning, execution, and monitoring between all key civilian actors and the military as part of a comprehensive approach.²⁷ What has been done to date is moving NATO in the right direction, but the pace of reform must increase. Given the demands of complex operations, much more can and should be done by the United States, NATO, and international partners to realize a true comprehensive approach. Moreover, the successful adoption of the Comprehensive Approach is vital to the future utility of NATO as an actor in military operations.